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FAMILY LAW
John W. Brand, Jr.*
Dan Hopson, Jr.**
The last two years produced family law cases under both the old and new
codes. Reported cases indicate that changes have been beneficial and the transi-
tion comparatively tranquil. Two areas, the scene of frequent and often puzz-
ling decisions in the past, are now easily understandable. A survey of recent
cases together with the 1965 Session Laws, reveals that the few transitional
rough spots are being or have been placated.
ANTE AND POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
A not infrequent area of litigation generates from contracts between spouses,
made before or after marriage, fixing property rights. The general rule by
which our court judges the validity of such contracts was stated sometime ago in
In re Estate of Cantrell.1 They "are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the in-
tensions of the makers, and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and
understandingly made, are just and equitable in their provisions and are not
obtained by fraud or overreaching."
In In the Matter of Estate of West," the court considers a trial court's findings
invalidating an antenuptial agreement. He was seventy-six years old and worth
close to $500,000. She was fifty-seven and a successful business woman with an
estate near $100,000. They had the same attorney. The attorney drew an ante-
nuptial agreement and a subsequent corresponding will whereby she inherited
about $27,000 from his estate and he would have received nothing from hers.
The documents contained ample recitals that the parties knew what they were
doing.
The trial court found that (1) he failed to inform her of the value of his
property, (2) he failed to advise her to see independent counsel-his counsel
being of no value to her, and (3) she was placed in a position of confidence
toward him by the impending marriage. From these facts the trial court found
the contract, "not freely understandably made ... and ... not just and equit-
able...."'
The supreme court did not agree. It pointed out that there was no misrepre-
sentation or willful concealment, and in effect said that the lack of a positive
effort to make complete disclosure is not in itself enough to sustain a finding
that the agreement was not "fairly and understandably made." Also, it did not
agree with the trial court's conclusion that $27,000 against a $500,000 estate was
Member of the Kansas Bar. A.B. 1954, LL.B. 1959, Kansas.
* Professor of Law, The University of Kansas. A.B. 1951, LL.B. 1953, Kansas; LL.M. 1954, Yale.
' 154 Kan. 546, 119 P.2d 483 (1941).
2Id. at 551, 119 P.2d at 488.
'194 Kan. 736, 402 P.2d 117 (1965).
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disproportionate, when he would have inherited nothing from her. The court
said that she did not absolutely need independent legal advice in that the at-
torney in question had served as her attorney in the past, and in that she re-
ceived benefit from his services in this instance.
From this and other recent cases,5 one must conclude that with such con-
tracts the court asks two questions:
1) Was the agreement fair?
2) Did the other party willfully conceal salient information? A proponent
of invalidity must show a negative answer to both questions.
It is obvious that the court weighs the total situation in judging these mat-
ters.' The finite lesson that an attorney can learn from these cases is that he must
do the same.
A second case in the area of marriage contracts, In the Matter of Estate of
Cooper,' deals with a postnuptial agreement that coupled an agreement resolv-
ing rights during life and after, with a collusive agreement whereby he agreed
to obtain and. she agreed not to contest a divorce action. The trial court held
that the agreements were separable. The supreme court said they were not.
Since they were made together and since they were intended to stand together,
they must fail together. The Cantrell case' had also stated that an agreement
that promoted divorce was void. In Cooper the court reviewed the law on the
meaning of "promote" and concluded that agreements which, (1) imposed an
obligation to sue for or procure a divorce, or (2) obligated a spouse not to de-
fend or contest a divorce suit were void as against public policy. It has always
been a concern that the court might find a particular agreement collusive.' In
a 1961 decision, Hoch v. Hoch,"° the court had hinted that an agreement might
have been collusive. Since such agreements are very common and since the
problem of collusion touches a significant percentage of them, this decision is
helpful. Active knowledge of these rules is indispensable to an attorney han-
dling divorce matters."'
CoMMoN-LAw MARIAGE
Can a spouse joined in an invalid ceremonial marriage have such marriage
annulled after the parties have lived together in Kansas as husband and wife?
The answer should be an obvious no, and the supreme court in effect so states
in Burnett v. Burnett.2 The court points out that in an annulment proceeding
it is the present marital status that should be considered. Since the parties had
5 See Ward v. Ward, 191 Kan. 404, 381 P.2d 347 (1963); In the Matter of Estate of Gillen, 191 Kan.
254, 380 P.2d 357 (1963).
6 See also Hopson, Divorce and Alimony Under the New Code, 12 KAN. L. REV. 27, 43 (1963).
195 Kan. 174, 403 P.2d 984 (1965).
I1n re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546, 119 P.2d 483 (1941).
See Hopson, supra note 6, at 43.10 187 Kan. 730, 359 P.2d 839 (1961)-.
'See also Bunger v. Bunger, 187 Kan. 642, 359 P.2d 1113 (1961), discussed in Brand & Hopson,
Family Law, 1959-1961 Survey oj Kan. Law, 10 KAN. L. REv. 219, 238 (1961), where the problem
centered on an antenuptial contract and the promotion of divorce.
192 Kan. 247, 387 P.2d 195 (1963).
[Vol. 14
SURVEY OF KANSAS LAW
engaged in a common-law marriage by living together, the validity of the
prior ceremonial marriage is immaterial.
DIVoRcE
Grounds
Preston v. Preston"3 is another of the many cases in which the supreme court
has limited its review of conflicting evidence on grounds to determining that
some of the evidence supported the trial court's findings. Appellant had been
found guilty of extreme cruelty. The supreme court cited the oft-repeated rule
that unjustified and long continued conduct which utterly destroys the legiti-
mate objects of marriage constitutes extreme cruelty, even in the absence of
physical violence or threats."
The appellee's evidence is a good illustration of this principle.
Harlow's evidence, as corroborated, showed that Gaynell commonly, and with no dis-
cretion, belittled him, his deceased father, and his friend and benefactor, Pete Charowhas,
also deceased; that she complained of her husband's failure to provide her with vacations,
and of having to live in apartments and of Harlow's not buying a home; that on nocturnal
social occasions she would become quarrelsome and argumentative and refuse to go home
unless forced to leave; and that on a couple of such occasions she had to be taken home.' 5
The court then said, "We think the evidence was ample to establish a course
of conduct on the part of the defendant sufficiently disruptive of matrimonial
harmony and humiliating to her husband as to be characterized as extreme
cruelty within the meaning of the statute."'" Gaynelle's transgressions serve not
only as a warning to the nagging wife, but also as a boon to the harried attorney
seeking evidence of grounds to present to the trial court.
Gardner v. Gardner" was another case involving sufficiency of the evidence
to establish grounds. But the appellee presented a much stronger case than in
Preston. The appellant also complained about a lack of corroborative testi-
mony. The court failed to recite the corroborative testimony in dispute, merely
stating that it was satisfactory. It cited Carter v. Carter" to the effect that
corroborative testimony may be circumstantial and that testimony corroborative
in character will not be disturbed on appeal.
With the Gardner case, the attorney may wonder if the court is loosening
the requirements for corroborative testimony. The court talks in terms of the
real need corroboration serves; this need being to prevent collusion. The Gard-
ner case gives an argument that the court might some day say that corrobora-
tion need only prove no collusion. Lindeman v. Lindeman" ends such specula-
tion. The divorce was contested. The husband's corroborative testimony was
193 Kan. 379, 394 P.2d 43 (1964).IAHayn v. Hayn, 162 Kan. 189, 175 P.2d 127 (1946).
"Preston v. Preston, 193 Kan. 379, 380-81, 394 P.2d 43, 44 (1964).
"Id. at 381, 394 P.2d at 45.
17 192 Kan. 529, 389 P.2d 746 (1964).
15 191 Kan. 80, 379 P.2d 311 (1963).
195 Kan. 357, 404 P.2d 958 (1965).
KANSAS LAW REViEw
given by a son from a former marriage and the son's wife; they testified that
they felt unwelcome in plaintiff's home. The trial court found this testimony
sufficient, but the supreme court did not. The grounds were gross neglect of
duty and extreme cruelty and plaintiff testified to acts that constituted such
grounds. But, said the court, the corroborative testimony did not pertain to the
acts that were the real basis for the divorce. The decision is totally consistent
with earlier cases.2 ° It does, however, filter out possible conclusions that could
be drawn from the Gardner case.
Pleading and Practice
Statutory Changes. Several statutory changes were made in divorce practice
by the last legislature. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1605 (1964) was amended by giving
the defendant the right to cross-file regardless of residence, if the plaintiff meets
the residence requirements of section 60-1603(a) or (b). Prior to the amend-
ment, the right was given only if plaintiff met the qualifications of section
60-1603(a). Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 356, § (a) states that the plaintiff must
have been a resident of the state at least one year. Section (b) states the resi-
dency requirement is met if the plaintiff "has been a resident of or stationed at
a United States post or military reservation in the state for one year." Thus,
the change allows the spouse of a petitioner relying on military residence to
cross-file.
An amendment to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1610(g) (1964) should rectify a
situation that caused considerable confusion. Prior to the amendment, the sec-
tion read in part: "Every decree of divorce shall contain a provision to the effect
that the parties are prohibited from contracting marriage with any other per-
sons until thirty (30) days after the decree shall become final."
When was the decree final? When judgment was rendered by the court or
when the time to take an appeal had expired? Attorneys developed three
theories on when a divorced person could remarry:
1) Thirty days from the date the trial judge entered judgment (a judg-
ment is entered on the day the journal entry is filed), based on the assumption
that the judgment was final when entered.
2) Sixty days from the date the trial judge entered judgment, based on the
assumption that the judgment was not known to be final until the appeal
period expired,2' but that on such date it was final retroactively to the date the
trial judge entered judgment.
3) Ninety days from the date the trial court entered judgment, based on
the assumption that the judgment was not final until the appeal period expired,
and that the thirty days began on the expiration of the appeal time.2
The amendment reads: the "parties are prohibited from contracting mar-
'See Tuley v. Tuley, 168 Kan. 106, 211 P.2d 95 (1949); Walton v. Walton, 166 Kan. 391, 202 P.2d
197 (1949).
'See KAN. STAT. ANN. S 60-2103(a) (1964) setting such period at thirty days plus an additional thirty
days if the party shows excusable neglect in failing to learn of the date.
' See also Hopson, supra note 6, at 45.
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riage with any other persons until sixty (60) days after the entry of the decree
and, if an appeal is taken, then until the receipt of the mandate from the
supreme court in accordance with K.S.A. 60-2106(c) .. ."" Now the re-
marriage date is clearly established as sixty days from the date the trial judge
enters judgment, unless there is actually an appeal.
A final change in this area took place in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1611 (1964)
on the effect of a divorce decree in another state. Prior to the amendment, this
section read, in part:
A judgment or decree of divorce rendered in any other state . . . shall be given full
faith and credit in this state; except, that in the event the defendant . . . was a resident
of this state and did not personally appear or defend the action in the court of such state
or territory, all matters relating to alimony, and to the property rights of the parties, and
to the custody and maintenance of the minor children of the parties, shall be subject to in-
quiry and determination in any proper action or proceeding brought in the courts of this
state within two (2) years ....
With the enactment of the 1964 code this section had been left intact ex-
cept that the phrase "had not been served personally with process,"24 which
appeared after the phrase "was a resident of this state" had been deleted.
Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 355, § 7 added the phrase, "and such court did not
have jurisdiction over his person," after "did not personally appear or defend the
action in the court of such state or territory."
It is universally accepted that an appearance in person by a nonresident be-
fore a court gives that court the same jurisdictional powers as personal service.26
These powers would include in a divorce case, the power to award alimony,
child custody, and support. By the deletion of the phrase, "had not been served
personally with process," the 1963 legislature seemed to be trying to protect the
person, who was personally served in the other state, but who did not appear
and defend, from alimony judgments. In view of the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the full faith and credit clause of the constitution26
this was obviously futile. The only practical effect of the deletion was to cause
attorneys to worry that the section might be unconstitutional.1
The 1965 amendment brings section 60-1611 more closely in line with the
United States Supreme Court cases that hold that, with in personam jurisdic-
tion, matters once tried are res judicata.2 s But since personal jurisdiction gives
this effect, the requirement of personal appearance is meaningless and should
have been deleted.
Collateral Attack. The Lindeman case2" deserves mention again at this
point. The wife had sued for separate maintenance. The trial court awarded
her a divorce. The supreme court reversed, stating it would be improper to
Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 355, S 6(g).
* Kan. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 220, S 1.
See Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1933).
ibid.
' Hopson, supra note 6, at 46.
'See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Comment,
6 KAN. L. REv. 429 (1958).
' 195 Kan. 357, 404 P.2d 958 (1965).
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force upon her that which she did not ask for. The opinion is consistent with
decisions in other jurisdictions, ° and distinguishable from Thompson v.
Thompson,"1 where the wife, after pleading for separate maintenance had stated
on the witness stand that she wanted a divorce.
In Hodge v. Hodge82 a wife was allowed to attack collaterally and upset a
divorce decree dividing the parties' property, by reason of the husband's extrin-
sic fraud in procuring the decree. In Hood v. Hood"8 a Kansas ex-wife brought
an action for monetary damages by reason of her ex-husband's deceit in pro-
curing the divorce. She recovered $125,000 in federal district court and the
court of appeals affirmed. He had artfully and grossly misrepresented the value
of his property. The parties had entered into a stipulation, she without the
benefit of effective independent counsel. Six months later, she presented the
stipulation to court when obtaining the divorce.
Is the action a collateral attack upon a state judgment? If so, she could not
prevail."' The court concludes that the action is based on tort-his deceit-and
therefore the divorce action is not a bar. Originally the opinion wrestles with
whether the stipulation was merged in the decree-then later concludes that it
didn't make any difference. As long as Mr. Hood's fraud was extrinsic the
deceit action was maintainable. Absent the difference in forums, the case is
simply a replay of Hodge v. Hodge.
Appealable Order. In Cusintz v. Cusintz," the appellant sought dismissal
of an ex parte support order on the ground that Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1611
(1964) was unconstitutional. The trial court ruled against him and he ap-
pealed. The supreme court found that such an order was not an appealable
order in that it was not a final decision as defined by section 60-2102. Since the
trial judge would have to pass on the constitutional question at the final hear-
ing, the decision is obviously correct. While the opinion does not reveal the
argument on unconstitutionality advanced by appellant, it may well be that
the problem was cured by the 1965 amendment.8"
Alimony and Division of Property
During the survey period, the Kansas Supreme Court was concerned, in
four different cases, with the problem of alimony and division of property.
While all four cases involved the construction of section 60-1511 of the old
code, having been decided by the trial courts prior to January 1, 1964, the four
opinions illustrate both the continued confusion concerning the meaning of the
old code and the desirability of the language in the new code-Kan. Sess. Laws
'See Davis v. Davis, 209 Iowa 1186, 229 N.W. 855 (1930); Cawley v. Cawley, 59 Utah 80, 202 Pac.
10 L1921).
168 Kan. 450, 213 P.2d 641 (1950).
186 Kan. 361, 349 P.2d 947 (1960); See Brand & Hopson, supra note 11.
3335 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1964).
The court cites McCormick v. McCormick, 82 Kan. 31, 107 Pac. 546 (1910).
195 Kan. 301, 404 P.2d 164 (1965).3 Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 335, S 7. See p. 275 supra.
'Kan. Sess. Laws 1941, ch. 285, S 1. See Hopson, Property Rights in Divorce and Separate Mainte-
nance Cases, 30 KAN. B.J. 302 (1962).
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1965, ch. 355, §§ 6(b)-(c). The opinions also indicate that perhaps the supreme
court will have, even under the new statute, a propensity to second guess the dis-
cretion of the trial court judge.
Preston v. Preston8 best illustrates the problems mentioned above. The
divorce was granted to the husband for the fault of the wife. The parties' net
worth was a little over $50,000, with approximately $28,000 in assets jointly
acquired. After giving the wife an old Cadillac and some household goods, the
trial court awarded her $10,000 in alimony payable at a rate of $150 a month.
The husband obtained the real estate worth $50,000 and the balance of the
personal property.
After pointing out that the old code did not allow alimony to be awarded
to a wife who is at fault, the supreme court went on to find no abuse of discre-
tion in awarding her the $10,000. The supreme court said that it would treat it
as a division of property, and not as alimony. The court, in its reasoning, how-
ever, itself lumped together alimony and division of property by citing cases
concerning whether an alimony award was an abuse of discretion rather than
whether the division of property was an abuse of discretion.
The court then correctly concluded that the $10,000 represented approxi-
mately one third of the jointly acquired property and that an equal division of
such property was not necessary. Hopefully, the new code39 now makes clear
that alimony is a support, not a division of property concept."'
Having approved the trial court's discretion in dividing the property, the
court then felt called upon to tinker with the form of the judgment. It ordered
the trial court to make the $10,000 award a lien on the real property of the hus-
band. This tinkering is of some importance in this case and also illustrates,
along with the other cases in this section, the tendency on the part of the
supreme court to second-guess the trial court's discretion in alimony and divi-
sion of property matters. This tendency on the part of the supreme court is
somewhat surprising in light of its past policy of almost complete abdication
to the trial court's discretion. 1
The willingness on the part of the supreme court to help out the "at fault"
wife by creating this lien is, potentially, a decision having considerable ramifica-
tions. The supreme court, in awarding the lien, cites three old Kansas cases4 2
to the effect that "an allowance of permanent alimony payable in installments
does not create a lien upon the husband's property unless the court makes pro-
s 193 Kan. 379, 394 P.2d 43 (1964).
'Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 355, §§ 6(b)-(c).
, As a predictor of future events, the attorney should note that the court's opinion stresses that the wife
was at fault. This fact is used by the court not only to scold the trial court about denominating the award
as alimony but also as a factor in determining the proper division of property. In other words, one basis forjustifying the uneven split is that the wife is at fault. Although it is argued elsewhere, see Hopson, Eco-
nomics of a Divorce: An Empirical Study at the Trial Court Level, 11 KAN. L. REv. 107, 136 (1962), that
fault should be irrelevant in a division of property concept and should be completely irrelevant under the
new code, see Hopson, supra note 6, at 42, it is likely that fault will influence not only the trial court judges
but also the supreme court. The language of the Preston case well illustrates the invidious nature of the
fault concept.
" See Brand & Hopson, supra note 11, at 235.
'Beasley v. Salkeld, 131 Kan. 211, 289 Pac. 471 (1930); McGill v. McGill, 101 Kan. 324, 166 Pac.
501 (1917); Scott v. Scott, 80 Kan. 489, 103 Pac. 1005 (1909).
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vision to such effect in its judgment."4 The trouble is, however, that even if
the trial court's award was alimony, both the writers44 and the court itself45
have considered the "no lien" rule abandoned since Haynes v. Haynes." For in-
stance, in Fangrow v. Fangrow the court said:
This opinion is not to be construed as any indication or inference that this court is de-
parting from the well-established rule that due and unpaid child support installments 47
decreed in a divorce action for the support and education of minor children of a marriage
become final judgments and a lien upon the real estate of the debtor father as of the date
they become due, in the same manner and to the same extent as other judgments of courts
of record of this state [citations omitted], and may be collected in the same manner as
other judgments. 48
The Fangrow case is not cited nor distinguished in the Preston opinion. Is,
then, the Preston case a return to the earlier no-lien Kansas rule?
The conclusion is important. The new alimony and child support statute49
does not specify whether or not the alimony and child support judgment is like
other judgments in that it is collectable by levy of execution and is a lien on the
property of the judgment debtor. Presumably, the old rule-that it was a lien-
was to continue. Preston now throws doubt on whether it is a lien unless the
trial court specifically so states in its decree.
It is possible to distinguish Preston on either of two grounds. First, the at-
torney for the wife apparently assumed that the old rule continued and that
he had to induce the supreme court to grant him a lien. Surely the husband's
attorney was not going to argue that she already had her lien. Secondly, and
more importantly, the supreme court itself points out that technically the $10,000
awarded the wife was not alimony as she was at fault. Consequently, the award
is a division of property. It is consistent to say that a cash award, effectuating a
division of property, does not become a lien on the other spouse's real property
unless so specified by the trial court. ° If this is all the court is holding, well and
good. However, it is quite unfortunate that they cited the old "alimony" cases
as requiring the trial court to make the lien in its judgment.
There is other independent evidence that the court is harking back to the
no-lien rule. In Longo v. Longo,5 decided the same day as Preston, the court,
after increasing the alimony award, closed its opinion by saying: "To effectuate
payment of the $18,500 permanent alimony judgment, the district court is
'Preston v. Preston, 193 Kan. 379, 385, 394 P.2d 43, 48 (1964).
" See Comment, Past Due Installments of Alimony and Child Support in Kansas, I KAN. L. REv. 71
(1952).
"See, e.g., Fangrow v. Fangrow, 185 Kan. 227, 341 P.2d 998 (1959); Edwards v. Edwards, 182 Kan.
737, 324 P.2d 150 (1958); Ortiz v. Ortiz, 180 Kan. 334, 304 P.2d 490 (1956).
, 168 Kan. 219, 212 P.2d 312 (1949).
'7 The court has never made any distinction between past-due alimony and past-due child support judg-
ments. In Edwards v. Edwards, 182 Kan. 737, 324 P.2d 150 (1958), the court lumps together past-due
child support and permanent alimony, as contrasted to alimony pendente lite, when pointing out that the
former were final judgments and could be collected in the same manner as other judgments.
185 Kan. 227, 229-30, 341 P.2d 998, 1000 (1959).
Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 355, § 6.
o See, eg., Cunningham v. Cunningham, 178 Kan. 97, 283 P.2d 405 (1955), where such a division was
specifically made a lien.
' 193 Kan. 386, 395 P.2d 302 (1964).
[Vol. 14
SURVEY OF KANSAS LAW
further directed to make said sum a lien upon the real and personal property
separately decreed ... ,"52 The problem was apparently not argued and the
lien was gratuitously given by the court. However, it at least appears that the
court, in these two cases, is thinking in terms of the old no-lien rule.
If a judgment does not operate automatically as a lien, it will be necessary
for the attorney to convince the trial court specifically to create the lien. The
problem is that Preston and Longo set out no standard to guide the judge.
Preston does cite an old case, 3 in which the standard seems to be some likelihood
that the husband will dispose of the property. But the facts in both Preston and
Longo clearly do not present that strong a case; the court speaks only of
"contingencies [which] might well occur in the interim."54 The court offers
no real verbal formula and the facts demonstrate only a rather large property
award to the husband with a rather skimpy cash award to the wife. Relative
size of the judgment will at least be a point to argue.
In the Longo case, the supreme court merely engaged in tinkering with the
trial court's judgment, although it was actually faced with a rather difficult
problem of determining what constituted the separate property of the wife.55
The court did not handle this problem particularly well, but did finally deter-
mine that the trial court's division of property was proper. The court then modi-
fied the alimony award by increasing it from $2,500 to $18,500 without suggest-
ing any basis other than an abuse of discretion based on the facts. The between-
the-lines impression is that the supreme court felt that the husband obtained
too large a share in the division of property, so it equalized the matter by in-
creasing the alimony award to her. In contrast is Darr v. Darr,56 where the
supreme court apparently felt that the trial judge had given too much to the
wife. It ordered the money award of $17,400 reduced by $5,000 and the rate of
payment-$200 a month-reduced to $150 per month. Both cases well illustrate
the supreme court's unsettling practice of second-guessing the discretion of the
trial court judge.
Attorneys have been reluctant to advise their client to appeal when the only
basis for the appeal was the fact that the trial court seemed to have been out of
line in the judgment. Perhaps the court had been almost too reluctant to inter-
fere.57 The cases decided during the last two years, perhaps, tip the balance the
other way. It would be fair to predict that there will be more wishful appeals
based on the trial court's abuse of discretion.
In Henderson v. Henderson, s the court resolved a problem existing under
the old code but not under the new code. Since alimony awards had to be for
a lump sum amount" and were not modifiable, it was assumed that a trial court
'Id. at 394, 395 P.2d at 308.
SBesse v. Besse, 137 Kan. 371, 20 P.2d 539 (1933).
Preston v. Preston, 193 Kan. 379, 385, 394 P.2d 43, 48 (1964). (Emphasis supplied.)
'This is no longer a relevant problem under the new code. See Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 355, § 6.
See also Brand & Hopson, Family Law, 1961-1963 Survey of Kan. Law, 12 KAN. L. REv. 257, 273 (1963).
194 Kan. 593, 400 P.2d 721 (1965).
See Brand & Hopson, supra note 11, at 235.
's 194 Kan. 456, 399 P.2d 877 (1965).
' See Hopson, supra note 37.
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was prohibited from increasing the time in which the fixed amount of alimony
must be paid as well as from changing the total amount. Henderson affirmed
that conclusion. The court pointed out that a final judgment could not be
modified subsequent to the term of court in which it was rendered."
CHILD CUSTODY
Jurisdiction and Full Faith and Credit
Three cases decided during the survey period involved those ever trouble-
some problems of jurisdiction and full faith and credit in custody matters.
In Talbott v. Talbott"' the court, in construing section 60-1510 of the old
code,"2 reaffirmed its earlier holdings"3 that the Kansas domicile of the child was
a jurisdictional prerequisite to entertaining a motion for change of custody.
This domicile requirement, reaffirmed by Talbott, was severely criticized. 4 In
the 1963 revision of the code of civil procedure the legislature abolished domicile
as the sole jurisdictional base. 5
But even prior to the effective date of the new code, the court in Turner v.
Melton,66 construing the old code, seemingly retreated from its domicile rule, al-
though the case can perhaps be explained upon other grounds. This case in-
volved the custody of a child. An Oklahoma judgment had awarded custody
to the father, who then moved his domicile to Wisconsin, taking the child with
him. The mother re-opened the Oklahoma judgment, and was awarded
custody. The father did not appear personally in the second proceeding; and
there was some doubt about the regularity of the appointment of the attorney
who appeared for him, and thus about the court's jurisdiction.
The mother "abducted"67 the child from Wisconsin, and took up domicile
in Kansas. The father thereupon sought habeas corpus in Kansas. The Kansas
trial court awarded custody to the mother, finding the father "unfit." The
father appealed, contending that the second Oklahoma judgment (awarding
custody to the mother) was invalid,"8 and that the mother was therefore not
empowered to establish the child's domicile in Kansas-thus, he argued, the
o Such modification would also violate the rule that alimony must be for a fixed sum. Note here that
the modification would have had the effect of decreasing the total amount paid to the wife since, by making
the payments less and extending the time for which they were paid, the wife would be forced to pay federal
income tax on the alimony she received. See generally 1 P-H 1965 FEo. TAX SERV. 7701.
194 Kan. 178, 398 P.2d 358 (1965).
'2 Kan. Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 278, § 1.
See, e.g., Tompkins v. Garlock, 189 Kan. 425, 370 P.2d 131 (1962); Niccum v. Lawrence, 186 Kan.
223, 350 P.2d 133 (1960).
"See Brand & Hopson, supra note 11, at 221-25; Harvey, Child Custody and Conflicts of Law, 30
KAN. B.J. 316, 321-22 (1962); Comment, Child Custody and the Conflict ot Laws in Kansas, 10 KAN. L.
REv. 595 (1962).
' See KAN. STAT. ANN. S 60-1610 (1964). For comment on the new jurisdictional standards, see Hop-
son, Divorce and Alimony Under the New Code, 12 KAN. L. REv. 27, 38-39 (1963). But see Nisi Prius
Decision, Section 60-1610(a) of the New Code Held Not to Confer Continuing Jurisdiction on Kansas
Courts in Child Custody Cases, 13 KAN. L. REv. 320 (1964).
" 194 Kan. 732, 402 P.2d 126 (1965).
The court itself puts quotes around the word.
He cited Hannon v. Hannon, 186 Kan. 231, 350 P.2d 26 (1960) as authority that the Oklahoma court
lacked jurisdiction. This argument is not particularly convincing, since the Oklahoma courts do not
necessarily follow Kansas cases.
[Vol. 14
SURVEY OF KANSAS LAW
child not being domiciled in Kansas, Kansas lacked jurisdiction to affect the
custody.
The supreme court at first seems to answer this argument by saying that the
Oklahoma judgment is not subject to collateral attack-thereby implying that
the basis of the decision might be the mother's lawful custody, empowering her
to change the child's domicile to Kansas. So far, so good, since the court would
then be following its established rule that jurisdiction over custody is based on
the child's domicile.
The court goes on, however, with that all too familiar language, "Be that
as it may..." and relies on an old case" enunciating the rule in force before
adoption of the domicile requirement. The older rule gave the court a parens
patriae power to affect the custody of any child before it, regardless of domicile.
The implication is obvious, therefore, that the court does not entirely adhere
to its heretofore well-established domicile requirement.
The Turner case, indicating, as it apparently does, the court's desire to throw
off the shackles of the domicile rule foreshadows its rather broad holding in
Lyerla v. Lyerla.7° Despite a trial court's holding7' that the new custody sec-
tion" did not change the domiciliary rule, the supreme court, quoting at length
from Judge Gard, 3 finds that the new section's broad language allows the exer-
cise of jurisdiction on the following fact situation.
In 1959 the plaintiff mother was awarded ten months' custody and the de-
fendant father was awarded two months' custody during each summer by the
Crawford County District Court. The mother, with the court's permission, mov-
ed to Las Vegas, Nevada. After several preliminary skirmishes in a Nevada
court, the father there asked for a change of custody in December 1963. This mo-
tion was continued. In the meantime, the father obtained custody of his child
during the summer and on July 2, 1964, filed a motion in the Kansas district
court asking for a change of custody. On July 6, 1964, the Nevada court ruled on
the father's December 1963 motion and continued the old custody order-ten
months to the mother and two summer months to the father. On July 28, 1964,
the Kansas trial court changed the child's custody to the father.
The mother appealed, arguing that a Kansas court had no power to change
custody since the child was not domiciled in Kansas. 4 The court concedes that
'Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 Pac. 606 (1930).
o 195 Kan. 259, 403 P.2d 989 (1965).Nisi Prius Decision, supra note 65.
"Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 355, § 6 provides:
Care of minor children. The court shall make provisions for the custody, support and education
of the minor children, and may modify or change any order in connection therewith at any time,
and shall always have jurisdiction to make any such order to advance the welfare of a minor child
if (i) the child is physically present in the county, or (ii) domicile of the child is in the state, or
(iii) the court has previously exercised jurisdiction to determine the custody or care of a child who
was at such time domiciled in the state....
"GARD, KANSAS CODE oF CIVIL PROCEDURE 730 (1963).
' It is at least arguable that the child was, in fact, domiciled in Kansas. Although the facts are not too
clear, it would appear that at the date of the Kansas district court's judgment, the father was enjoying his
two months' summer custody of the child. When custody shifts from one parent to the other, the domicile
of the child also shifts. See Tompkins v. Garlock, 189 Kan. 425, 370 P.2d 131 (1962). The court and the
parties apparently assumed, however, that the domicile was with the mother in Nevada.
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the prior holdings of the Kansas Supreme Court would so indicate. But, said
the court, the new code changed the rule. The court pointed out that the 1955
amendment provided at least two bases for jurisdiction in this case. First, the
child was physically present in Crawford County when the father's motion was
filed and heard and, second, the Crawford County District Court had exercised
jurisdiction over the custody of the child at a time when he was domiciled in
Kansas.
This whole-hearted acceptance of the two nondomiciliary bases for jurisdic-
tion by the court is indeed welcome. Doubt had been expressed"5 as to whether
the court, due to its strong adherence to the domicile rule, would unreservedly
accept the new statute. There was a fear that the court might find it unconstitu-
tional. 6 Although no constitutional argument was made, the court in no way
intimated any fear for the validity of the new section."'
The Lyerla case also raised two full faith and credit issues. The mother
argued that since the Nevada action was pending at the time of the Kansas de-
cision, the Kansas district court should have held proceedings in abeyance await-
ing Nevada's action. The court, citing Kirby v. Kirby,"8 pointed out that such
rule did not apply to actions in a foreign jurisdiction.
The mother also argued that full faith and credit should be given to the
Nevada decision affirming her custody." The court avoided the issue by finding
that the Nevada decree did not purport to determine the issue of whether there
should be a change of custody, but rather that the Nevada decree determined
only the issue of temporary visitation rights."0
The above cases illustrate the impossible situation facing American courts
in the custody area. No acceptable solution has yet been proposed."' The next
survey will undoubtedly report additional thorny problems of conflict of law in
custody cases.
Basis of Award
On five different occasions during the survey period, the court was faced
with that ever recurring problem of the propriety of a trial court's custody
award. Most appellants are faced with the unenviable burden of inducing the
supreme court to reverse the trial court's discretion. In none of the five cases
was the appellant successful. There was some evidence in the record, in every
case, to sustain the trial court's judgment.
Finding abuse of discretion a difficult point for reversal, appellants also try
'5 See Hopson, supra note 65, at 38.7 5Ibid.
77 See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS S 136 (4th ed. Scoles 1964) for a review of the various bases ofjurisdiction used by state courts.
" 143 Kan. 430, 55 P.2d 356 (1936).
"The Nevada decision was twenty-two days prior to the conclusion of the Kansas district court
proceedings.
o The mother also argued that there was no change of circumstances justifying a change in the custody
award. The basis of this argument, apparently, was that there was no change of circumstances since the
prior Kansas award (not since the Nevada award). Thus, the issue of to what extent change of circum-
stances allows a second state to make a new custody award was not at issue. See Harvey, supra note 64.
.' For a noble attempt, see Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REV. 795 (1964).
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to claim that the trial court applied improper standards. In Gardner v. Gard-
ner82 the husband obtained the divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty. He
showed that his wife no longer loved him nor desired to take care of the
children. Five months prior to the divorce action she had walked out on him
and the children, even though the children were sick. She had told the husband
she did not want the children. The trial court granted him custody of the
children, although it did not find the mother unfit. The mother argued that,
in light of "the tender years of the children, and the favored position of the
mother in the eyes of the law," 3 a finding of unfitness was a prerequisite to
awarding custody to the father. The supreme court pointed out that the
mother's argument was confused. In a contest between a parent and a third
person, Kansas does require that the parent be found unfit before custody can
be awarded to the third person.84 "Where the issue exists only between the
parents, as in the instant case, and no third party is involved, then the primary
question to be determined by the court is the welfare and best interests of the
children. All other questions are subordinate."8 So, as between parents, an
unfitness finding is immaterial. All that is needed is evidence to show that it
would be in the best interests of the child to be awarded to the parent granted
custody.
Without detailing any facts, the court in Bergen v. Bergen86 cited Gardner
and affirmed the trial court's award of the child to the father. The court also
pointed out that the trial court had found the mother unfit. Since there was sub-
stantial evidence of unfitness, the trial court obviously had to be sustained. A
finding of unfitness is not even required by Gardner.
In In the Matter of Stagford"7 the court applied the rule concerning custody
as between a parent and a third person. Here the mother brought a habeas
corpus action to obtain her child, who was residing with the mother's parents.
The grandparents had had the child since infancy, apparently because the
mother had been mentally ill and had been committed to the Hertzler Clinic.
The trial court denied the writ, finding the mother an unfit person, and
awarded custody to the grandparents. The supreme court reaffirmed the re-
quirement that the mother must be unfit before the grandparents could obtain
custody.
The court then turned to the question of whether the evidence sustained the
trial court's finding of unfitness. Citing In the Matter of Vallimont,88 the court
pointed out that the grandparents had the burden of showing the mother's un-
fitness. Both a psychologist " and a psychiatrist testified that in 1955, the date
192 Kan. 529, 389 P.2d 746 (1964).
Id. at 532, 389 P.2d at 749.
This rule has been criticized, see Hopson, Family Law, 1955-1956 Survey of Kan. Law, 5 KAN. L.
REv. 255, 260-63 (1956); Comment, The Law of Custody and its Adequacy, 10 KAN. L. REv. 560 (1962).
'
5 Gardner v. Gardner, 192 Kan. 529, 533, 389 P.2d 746, 749 (1964).
195 Kan. 103, 403 P.2d 105 (1965).
"193 Kan. 120, 392 P.2d 140 (1964).
, 182 Kan. 334, 321 P.2d 190 (1958).
"The right of a psychologist to offer expert opinion concerning the mental illness of a person may be
somewhat in doubt, since he is not a doctor of medicine and traditionally doctors of medicine have claimed
the sole expertise in this field. The court remarked that the qualifications of the clinical psychologist wer;
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of the examination, the mother had a sociopathic personality and that, from
observation of the mother in the courtroom, it would be their opinion that the
same condition existed. Further, they testified that such a mother would not be
a fit person to have custody of her child. Both experts indicated, however, that
they felt that the mother should be reexamined. This, apparently, was not done.
Although the decision is probably correct, the court is upon somewhat shaky
ground. The experts' testimony as to the mother's condition at the time of the
trial was quite weak. Since the grandparents have the burden of proof, the
mother would seem to have a fair argument that the testimony of the experts
concerning her condition at the time of the trial was so weak that the burden
had not been sustained. It perhaps would have been better to have had the
mother reexamined?
The mother also argued that so long as she was physically and morally fit,
her alleged mental illness was not germane to the issue of unfitness. In answer,
the court quoted, once again, from In the Matter of VallimonP1 to the effect that
"violence of temper or inability or indisposition to control unparental traits of
character or conduct, might constitute unfitness. So, also, incapacity to appreci-
ate and perform the obligations resting upon parents might render them unfit,
apart from other moral defects." 2
The other two cases are concerned with the problem of what evidence is re-
quired to obtain a change of custody. In Whitebread v. Kilgore,3 the child
had been awarded to the mother. Subsequently, both parents remarried. The
father had had difficulty exercising visitation rights and moved for a change of
custody. The day before the hearing, the mother, the child, and the new hus-
band left Kansas. The mother defaulted and the father and his new wife were
the sole witnesses. They testified that they both wanted the child. The trial
court refused to change the custody. The supreme court affirmed, finding that
the trial court had not abused this discretion. The court, quoting from Burns
v. Burns,94 held that the fact that the mother had taken the child from the
jurisdiction of the court95 did not necessitate a change of custody order. The
primary test, said the court, continued to be what was best for the child. Under
such a test, the trial court had not abused its sound judicial discretion.
In Lyerla v. Lyerla,96 the trial court sustained a father's motion to change
custody to him. Here the mother had had custody for several years and, during
that time, the boy had developed "undesirable traits of character." The mother
not challenged. See Brand & Hopson, supra note 55, at 267, discussing the case of Hammack v. Hammack,
189 Kan. 509, 370 P.2d 93 (1962), where a psychologist was allowed, without objection, to testify as to
the mental illness of a wife in a case involving the right of a husband to obtain a divorce on the grounds
of cruelty.
' See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-235 (1964) which would probably allow the court to order such an
examination.
9' 182 Kan. 334, 340, 321 P.2d 190, 196 (1958).
"In the Matter of Stafford, 193 Kan. 120, 124, 392 P.2d 140, 144 (1964).
193 Kan. 66, 391 P.2d 1019 (1964).
177 Kan. 116, 276 P.2d 308 (1954).
"In Burns the trial court had ordered the mother to keep the child in Kansas. There had been no
such order in Whitebread.
9" 195 Kan. 259, 403 P.2d 989 (1965).
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had been forced to put her nine-year-old son in a military school since she could
not handle him. This, said the court, was a sufficient change of circumstances
to allow the trial court to change its custody order.
In both Whitebread and Lyerla, the court discusses the requirement that the
trial court make a finding that there has been a change of circumstances. White-
bread was decided prior to the new code; Lyerla was decided afterwards. An
argument can be made that section 60-1610(a), due to the change in wording,
no longer requires a "change of circumstances" before a trial judge may change
custody. 7 Lyerla would seem to hold otherwise. However, the father did not
make that argument and, since he was successful in showing a change of cir-
cumstances, didn't need to.
In the survey two years ago it was pointed out that fathers had been faring
much better in their custody fights with mothers. 8 During this survey period,
in the four cases involving fathers and mothers, fathers won three times. In the
past, attorneys were forced to advise fathers that their chances of obtaining cus-
tody were slim 9 The cases decided during the last four years perhaps indicate
that they at least have a "fighting chance."
Disclosures
Olney v. Hobble'° considers a situation of practical interest to practicing
attorneys. Plaintiff and his ex-wife had been divorced in February. In June she
had given birth to a child and immediately consented to and gave the child for
adoption. The defendant had been the attorney for the prospective adoptive
parents.
Plaintiff brought a habeas corpus action against the defendant and others
to obtain the child. During the trial, the defendant was asked to give the names
of his clients who took the child. He refused on the basis that such information
was privileged between attorney and client. The trial court found the defen-
dant-attorney guilty of contempt and the supreme court affirmed. In essence
the supreme court said the statute, which provided: "If he has had the party in
his custody or under his restraint,'' and has transferred him to another, he
shall state to whom, the time, place and cause of the transfer ... ."'02 was para-
mount to the attorney-client privilege. 8 The supreme court simply said that
since the legislature had said that one with this information should reveal it, the
quoted section was controlling. As the only given reason, this is puzzling. The
legislature just as certainly states that the attorney is incompetent to testify on
the matter. The court seems to be saying that since the quoted section is more
See Brand & Hopson, supra note 55, at 262; Hopson, supra note 65, at 38.
Brand & Hopson, supra note 55, at 261.
See Comment, supra note 84.
"0 193 Kan. 692, 396 P.2d 367 (1964).
l The facts recited do not disclose whether the attorney had either physical or technical custody of the
baby. If not, the decision is indeed puzzling.
Kan. Sess. Laws 1909, ch. 182, S 696, now substantially KAN. STAT. AwN. S 60-1504(b)(3) (1964).
'Kan. Sess. Laws 1909, ch. 182, S 321. The current provision is considerably more elaborate. KAN.
STAT. ANN. S 60-426 (1964).
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specifically applicable, it should be determinative. There may be a good reason
for the result, but this is not it.
The Kansas Supreme Court has frequently said that there was an exception
to the attorney-client privilege where the communication was for an unlawful
purpose involving either crime or fraud. °4
In the Olney case, there was no crime nor fraud, at least in the conventional
sense. Certainly there was no showing of moral turpitude. The act was simply
the taking of a child for adoption without the father's consent. While the
parties should have known that consent was required, they were not subject to
punishment for proceeding as they did.
There is simply a direct conflict in statutes. To resolve the problem, the
court had to write an exception into one statute. Either the attorney-client
privilege does not apply in disclosure habeas corpus situations, or disclosure in
a habeas corpus situation is not required when an attorney-client relationship
exists.
There are arguments available to either viewpoint. If the attorney-client
privilege is of sufficient value to protect in matters involving fraud, why not
protect it here? On the other hand, the restraint of one's liberty is a situation
deeply nocuous to our society. Perhaps there is no justification, under any cir-
cumstances, for a rule that would foster such restraint.
One wonders if the court was not influenced by the fact that, in such a
situation, the attorney plays an active role. Normally, the attorney-client privi-
lege is passive in that the attorney is only told what happened. But in the habeas
corpus-adoption situation the attorney is an active participant, often the only
one. To allow him silence is to insure that the restraint continues. Perhaps the
court felt this too high a price for the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege.
Attorneys" Fees
Two cases during the period touch on the question of attorneys' fees. In
Bergen v. Bergen. 5 the trial court gave the husband the children, and decreed
divorce for the wife's fault. The wife obtained some alimony and $250 in at-
torneys' fees. One of her complaints on appeal was the small sum for attorneys'
fees. The supreme court affirmed, noting that the plaintiff earned only $5,850 a
year and that the trial court was in the best position to judge the adequacy of the
fee. In Talbott v. Talbott'° the wife sought and obtained an increase in child-
' In In re Estate of Koellen, 167 Kan. 676, 208 P.2d 595 (1949), a client learned of a defect in an
instrument through his attorney and then forged a document to replace the defective writing. The court
said that the client was perpetuating a fraud involving moral turpitude, and therefore his conversation with
the attorney was not privileged. In State v. Wilcox, 90 Kan. 80, 132 Pac. 982 (1913), communications
were made to an attorney in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit a criminal libel. They were held not
privileged. However, in Emerson v. Western Auto. Indem. Ass'n, 105 Kan. 242, 182 Pac. 647 (1919), a
communication involving a question of fraud was held privileged when no moral turpitude was shown.
The court said: "It is difficult to draw any hard and fast line; but there would be little left of the privilege
if, in a doubtful case, communications between attorney and client relating to the best way to protect the
client's interests could be inquired into, although, the final conclusion, perhaps on appeal to this court, might
be that fraud in law was involved." Id. at 249, 182 Pac. at 650.
'o 195 Kan. 103, 403 P.2d 125 (1965).
'0 194 Kan. 178, 398 P.2d 358 (1965).
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support payments. The trial court awarded $100 attorneys' fees. In affirming the
support increase, the supreme court merely said that the attorneys' fee followed
as a natural consequence of the order.' °7
CHILD SUPPORT
Jurisdiction and Full Faith and Credit
In Talbott v. Talbott,"0 8 the Kansas Supreme Court was faced with the
argument that the same jurisdictional rules applied to both child support and
custody. Here the mother had obtained custody in a divorce case and subse-
quently moved to California. Later she filed a motion to increase the child-
support payments. The father moved to change custody. The trial court found
that it did not have jurisdiction to change custody," 9 but did order an increase
in child support. The father suggested that if domicile was a jurisdictional re-
quirement for a custody award under the old statute, there was nothing in the
act" 0 to suggest that a different jurisdictional base should exist for a child-sup-
port award.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court but its "facts and circumstances"
opinion seems somewhat ethereal. The court said: "Defendant, who was, and
is, the one making the payments, at all times continued to reside in Wichita,
and thus was within the court's jurisdiction. Under the facts of this case, there-
fore, we hold that the district court of Sedgwick county had jurisdiction to make
the order that it did.""' The court cites no authority for its statement. Courts
have uniformly assumed that both alimony and child-support awards required
in personam jurisdiction over the husband-father or quasi in rem jurisdiction
over his property."2 The court also has available the concept of continuing in
personam jurisdiction so that renewed personal service is not necessary."' If
the language quoted above is merely an inartful statement of the rule of con-
tinuing jurisdiction, it is undoubtedly correct. If, however, it is a suggestion
that the domicile of the father in Kansas is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a
support order, the holding of the court would seem to be a radical departure
from established practice. The duty to support may be measured by the law of
the domicile of the father," 4 but surely jurisdiction is not. A child support
judgment should not require both in personam jurisdiction over the father and
the domicile of the father.
In Hamilton v. Netherton"' the mother brought suit in Kansas to obtain
a lump-sum judgment for child support based upon a Nevada decree. The
'1o For a discussion of the granting of fees in other circumstances, see Brand & Hopson, Family Law,
1961-1963 Survey o Kan. Law, 12 KAN. L. REV. 257, 273 (1963).
'c 194 Kan. 178, 398 P.2d 358 (1965).
10 See also text accompanying note 61 supra.
" Kan. Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 278, S 1.
"'Talbott v. Talbott, 194 Kan. 178, 180, 398 P.2d 358, 360 (1965).
" See EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 82 (1962).
a Ibid.
'"But see Wahl v. Walsh, 180 Kan. 313, 304 P.2d 525 (1956) where the court uses Kansas law even
though the father, mother, and child were all domiciled in Washington.194 Kan. 683, 401 P.2d 657 (1965).
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father attempted to relitigate the merits of the Nevada award. The Kansas
Supreme Court, citing Fischer v. Kipp,"' pointed out that under the full faith
and credit clause of the United States Constitution, such a collateral attack was
improper.
The father did obtain, however, a reversal of the trial court as to the amount
of interest collectable on this foreign judgment. The trial court had allowed
the six percent interest to be compounded monthly. The supreme court, citing
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 16-204 (1964), the statute providing for interest on judgments,
held that only simple interest was proper.
Obviously, the court assumed that the Kansas interest statute was applicable
to foreign judgments as well as judgments of Kansas district courts. No
authority is cited and the problem of whether the Kansas or Nevada interest
statute applies was not discussed."' In so holding the Kansas court takes, with-
out evaluation of the proper rule, the minority position that the forum statute
was applicable."'
Illegitimate Children
Addington v. Addington,"' was an action, by a mother as next friend,
for her illegitimate son, against the father for support. The plaintiff appealed
a trial court order for $150 a month, claiming the court erred in, (1) consider-
ing a contract between the parents, (2) not giving him a larger sum in view of
the wealthy status of his father, and (3) placing the control of the funds with
someone other than his mother. The court first cites Wahl v. Walsh" as
authority for an illegitimate child's right to sue for the father's nonstatutory
obligation to support. It then decided not to disturb the trial court's judgment,
considering the matters raised within the trial court's discretion.
The Addington case does raise a couple of interesting questions. Appellant
contended that a contract between the parties should not have been allowed in
evidence. The court disagreed. Such a contract has been held not to be binding
on the court."2 But this does not mean that the contract must be totally dis-
regarded. It can and should be considered by the court in judging the total
situation."'
JUVENILE CODE
Dependency and Neglect
In Lennon v. State,2' the supreme court approved the judgment of the
Meade County District Court which had held, in a trial de novo, that a little girl
177 Kan. 196, 277 P.2d 598 (1954).
' It is possible that the Nevada interest statute provides for only six percent simple interest. It was not
cited by the court and there is no suggestion in the opinion that the court felt that it should examine the
Nevada statute.
'See EHRENZWEIG, CONFLiCT OF LAWS § 195 (1962).
.. 192 Kan. 118, 386 P.2d 219 (1963).
180 Kan. 313, 304 P.2d 525 (1956).
'a See Myers v. Anderson, 145 Kan. 775, 67 P.2d 542 (1937).
The court cites no authority for this rule. The court has said, however, that a nonbinding custody
agreement may be considered. Leach v. Leach, 179 Kan. 557, 296 P.2d 1078 (1956).
'm 193 Kan. 685, 396 P.2d 290 (1964).
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was dependent and neglected and that the parental rights of the mother be
severed. The court extensively reviewed the evidence and concluded that it was
sufficient to sustain the trial court's findings. This case is the subject of an ex-
tensive discussion appearing in 14 Kan. L. Rev. 117 (1965), and extended com-
ment will therefore be omitted in this survey. Although the decision is perhaps
correct on the facts presented, the supreme court was apparently too narrow in
its analysis of the problem.
Statutory Changes
The Kansas Juvenile Code was rather extensively modified by the 1965
legislature." 4 In the key change, the legislature amended Kan. Stat. Ann. §
38-802 (1964)"' to provide that the act would be applicable to all children up
to the age of eighteen. The prior act was applicable to girls up to eighteen years
of age, but limited jurisdiction to boys to those less than sixteen years of age.
At the same time that the legislature increased the age limit, it added to
section 38-808 a provision whereby the juvenile court, after taking jurisdiction
of the sixteen- and seventeen-year-old boys, could enter an order that there were
reasonable grounds to believe that the boy would have committed a felony if
an adult, and that the juvenile court's facilities were not sufficient to give this
boy care, treatment, and training. Upon entering such an order, the court could
direct the county attorney to prosecute the boy in the district court."m In addi-
tion, the juvenile court was granted the authority to commit boys sixteen or
seventeen to the State Industrial Reformatory at Hutchinson, as well as to the
State Industrial School for Boys at Topeka." 7 However, no sixteen- or seven-
teen-year-old boys could be committed to the Boys' Industrial School without
prior approval from the Director of the Division of Institutional Management.
In effect, the legislature has said that the juvenile code will extend to sixteen-
and seventeen-year-old boys, but when they commit a felony the juvenile judge
may have them treated as adults. If the juvenile judge retains jurisdiction over
them, he may, although they are guilty only of being delinquent, commit them
to Hutchinson. Although the right of a juvenile judge to sentence a "delin-
quent" to a penal institution may raise serious constitutional problems," such
problems will not be discussed in this survey as they will be subject to an exten-
sive comment in a later issue of the Kansas Law Review.
The other changes in the juvenile code were minor. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-
819 (1964) was amended' to allow temporary custody to be given to the
County Department of Social Welfare as well as the State Department of Social
Welfare. Under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-824 (1964), the juvenile court may no
See Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, chs. 278-80.
Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 278.
' Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 278, S 3.
' Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 278, S 6.
'See Paulsen, Fairness to the juvenile Oflender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547 (1957); Sheridan & Freer,
Delinquent Children in Penal Institutions (Children's Bureau, Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare, No. 415,
1964).
'Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 279.
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longer appoint a guardian of the estate (conservator). i" ° Since the probate
court is given exclusive jurisdiction over conservators,' it was felt that the
juvenile court should not exercise such jurisdiction. The new amendment pro-
vides that the State Department of Social Welfare may file application for the
appointment of itself as the conservator for the child, and that the probate court
shall forthwith appoint the State Board of Social Welfare as such conservator.
Other changes in the juvenile code pertain to the change in language necessi-
tated by the changes in both the guardianship and treatment statutes." 2
LEGISLATION CONCERNING CHILDREN
Period of Minority
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-101 (1964) was amended by the 1965 legislature.3 ' This
section was subject to the possible interpretation that although marriage, at
eighteen or older, conferred some rights of majority upon the married person,
the divorce of that person reconferred minority status. The new section makes
it clear that once the minor is married, his majority status continues even though
a divorce has been obtained.
Other Legislation
The 1965 Kansas legislature passed several other statutes that are of interest
to the Kansas practitioner. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-904 (1964), which is part of the
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, was amended to make clear that the custodian
would not have the power to pledge or mortgage custodial property.3 4
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-701 to -711 (1964) was extensively revised. 3 This
article deals with crimes affecting children. For the first time, jail sentences are
provided for anyone who gives or sells revolvers, brass knuckles, or other
dangerous weapons to children, and for any minor who possesses such weapons.
The penalty for cruelty to children was increased, as well as the penalty for al-
lowing a child to be in a situation where his health is likely to be endangered.
The selling or giving of intoxicating liquors to a child under twenty-one years of
age was made a crime. The legislature increased the penalty for a minor's
falsifying his age when attempting to obtain alcoholic liquor.
At the same time, the Kansas legislature adopted the so-called "Battered
Child" statute. 8 This act requires doctors, nurses, social or case workers, and
others, who have knowledge that a child has received physical abuse, to report
such information to the juvenile court. The physician-patient privilege is
abolished as to such report, and the failure to report is made a misdemeanor.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-120 (1964) was amended to allow recovery from the
' Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 280. This change was made to conform to the new act for obtaining a
guardian or conservator or both. Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 347.
See Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch-. 347.
' See Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, chs. 347-48.
" Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 274.
'M Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 282.
" Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 277.
" Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 386.
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parents, to the amount of $1,000, for any damages caused by a minor under
eighteen years of age who lives with his parents."' 7 If the jury finds that the act
was malicious or willful, the $1,000 limitation is removed. The legislature also
entered into the Interstate Compact on Juveniles. 8' This compact will allow
Kansas to handle the problem of the runaway juvenile who crosses state lines.
FAMILY TORTS
The rule was well established in Kansas by Sink v. Sink,' that one spouse
could not recover for the other's torts. In O'Grady v. Potts,4' the court modified
this rule in the situation where the cause of action arose and the suit was com-
menced prior to the marriage. Without discussing the validity of the policy
rules underlying Sink, the court allowed the suit on the theory that the Married
Women's Act' allowed a wife to keep choses in action as her separate property.
Since this suit was such a chose, she could continue to maintain the suit.
Hoping that this foreshadowed an overruling of Sink, another wife brought
suit. This time the action occurred during the marriage, but the case was dis-
tinguishable from Sink. She asked: Does it make a difference if (1) a divorce
action is pending between the parties, or (2) the tort is intentional? In Fisher
v. Toler 4 ' the supreme court said that it did not. The court reasoned that the
filing of the divorce action did not change the marital status and that a personal
injury, whether caused wantonly or negligently, was still a tort. Husbands and
wives may not sue each other for postnuptial torts. O'Grady was merely cited.
Justice Fontron dissented and was joined by Justice Wertz. He felt that both
factual distinctions from the Sink case should have been controlling. He pointed
out that the reason for the rule was to discourage that which would be disrup-
tive of the marital relationship. When the reason for the rule was absent, why
enforce the rule? He also felt a distinction should be drawn between negligent
and willful acts.
There is a split of authority on both questions.'43 California has recently,
without legislative aid, in a tour de force allowed suits between husband and
wife for both intentional and negligent postnuptial injury.'44 Kansas has taken
the older and more conservative view in each instance.
MISCELLANEOUS LEGISLATION
Two statutes, passed by the 1965 legislature, should at least be noted. The
legislature enacted major legislation completely revamping the probate code
" Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 275.
5 Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 283.
' 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933 (1952).
193 Kan. 644, 396 P.2d 285 (1964), 14 KAN. L. REV. 124 (1965).
' KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-201 to -207 (1964).
"n 194 Kan. 701, 401 P.2d 1012 (1965).
14 See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955). For divorce allowing the spouse to sue, see Goode v. Martinis,
58 Wash. 2d 229, 361 P.2d 941 (1961). For willfulness making a difference, see Ennis v. Truhitle, 306
S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1957).
"' Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962) (intentional tort); Klein v. Klein,
58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (negligent tort).
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sections relating to the treatment of the mentally ill and the appointment of
guardians for such persons. 4 ' Discussion of these acts will not be attempted
here, as they are extensively reviewed in an article by Robert Cobean, who
was Chairman of the Judicial Council Committee drafting the acts. 4 '
The Kansas legislature also reacted to the population boom in two separate
acts. One.47 permits the State Board of Health to establish and maintain family
planning centers in cooperation with County Social Welfare Departments.
Such centers will be allowed to furnish and disseminate information concern-
ing contraceptives. The other act 4 ' repealed statutes 4 ' providing, under certain
circumstances, for the sterilization of inmates of state institutions. Although it
was arguable that this act only applied to inmates of state institutions, there was
widespread belief on the part of Kansas doctors that sterilization was unlawful
outside the provisions of the act. Thus they declined to sterilize individuals,
even with the patients' consent. By repealing this statute, the legislature has
now clearly allowed voluntary sterilization in Kansas.
'dBKan. Sess. Laws 1965, chs. 347-48.
'The New Kansas Philosophy Relating to "Care and Treatment," "Guardians," and "Conservators,"
34 KAN. B.J. 329 (1965). See also Judge Swinehart's discussion of terminological changes, A Classification
ot the New Terms, Definitions, Procedures Affecting the Probate Code, Id. at 324.
"'Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 384.
' Kan. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 477.
'4' KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-149 to -155 (1964).
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